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The EU Must Step Up Its  
Approach to EU-US Data Flows
The Euro-American data relationship is deeply troubled. In fact, it now 
faces an impossible “trilemma” among three core policy objectives: 
bulk intelligence collection, open transatlantic digital commerce, and 
the EU’s fundamental rights. The EU needs to take action if it is to 
protect the economically critical transatlantic data corridor and main-
tain the tech leadership role Europe wants.   
 – The incoming Biden administration provides a new opportunity 
to address the thresholds and accountability for bulk data col-
lection on foreign nationals, particularly for allied democracies, 
in a way that could resolve this issue more permanently.
 – The EU must forge consensus positions on European data rules 
that are credible to international partners and can withstand 
court scrutiny.
 – The EU should work with both the US and UK to determine what 
compliant data protection and surveillance standards should entail.
 – The EU, US, and UK – along with like-minded countries such as 
Australia, Japan, and South Korea – should work on a twin track 
approach to personal data governance in the democratic space. 
This approach should simultaneously raise privacy standards 
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THE GEOPOLITICS OF 
PERSONAL DATA
On July 16, 2020, a decision by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) put the European Commission and 
United States in an impossible situation on trans-
atlantic data. Known as Schrems II after the Austri-
an privacy advocate Max Schrems who brought the 
case, it effectively eviscerated the EU-US Privacy 
Shield, a four-year-old framework governing the 
transfer of personal data across the Atlantic.1 The 
decision thereby confronted the EU and the United 
States with an impractical “trilemma” among three 
core policy objectives:
• Bulk intelligence collection,
• Open transatlantic data flows, and
• Fundamental rights as defined by the EU’s Charter.
In their current forms, the EU can only have two of 
the three but never all three at the same time.
Even as the EU’s data relationship with the Unit-
ed States is changing, there are also new complica-
tions in how intelligence services collect data in the 
EU and United Kingdom – importantly, given the 
UK is on the precipice of leaving the EU on Decem-
ber 31, 2020. And yet, taken together, these develop-
ments could push for new approaches to deal with 
data protection in a more meaningful way. The EU, 
US, and UK could form the core of a new democrat-
ic personal data space that effectively addresses the 
trilemma in light of emerging technologies, evolving 
circumstances, and a rising digital China.
CONSTANT REBOOTING: 
BACKGROUND ON THE ROCKY 
EU-US DATA RELATIONSHIP
The European Commission is responsible for looking 
at how non-EU states treat the personal data of Eu-
ropean citizens and issuing so-called adequacy find-
ings for those countries if their legal systems provide 
a standard of data protection essentially equivalent 
to the one found in the EU.2 When a country – for ex-
1 Court of Justice of the European Union, “The Court of Justice invalidates Decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US 
Data Protection Shield,” Press Release, July 16, 2020: <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-07/cp200091en.pdf> (accessed 
November 30, 2020).
2 European Commission, “Adequacy decisions: How the EU determines if a non-EU country has an adequate level of data protection”: <https://ec.europa.
eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en> https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-
protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en> (accessed November 30, 2020).
3 See the website of the Privacy Shield: <https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome> (accessed November 30, 2020).
4 Atlantic Council, “Building a Transatlantic Digital Marketplace: Twenty Steps Toward 2020,” April 2016: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Building_a_Transatlantic_Digital_Marketplace_web_0406.pdf> (accessed November 30, 2020).
ample, Israel – attains this prized finding, it is given 
the green light for the transfer of European personal 
data. In this way, an adequacy finding enables “visa 
free” travel for data between the EU and these coun-
tries, in turn fostering many aspects of their digital 
economies, from social media to video conferencing 
systems.
In 2016, the Commission had bestowed adequacy for 
data transfers on the United States under the EU-US 
Privacy Shield despite deep reservations about the 
bulk data collection practices of the US intelligence 
community.3 The Privacy Shield, which was used by 
around 5,300 companies, was an attempt to address 
the shortcomings of the earlier Safe Harbor Agree-
ment that was invalidated in a 2015 ECJ case known 
as Schrems I. That case challenged how the National 
Security Agency (NSA) gobbled up foreign data fol-
lowing the revelations made by US whistleblower 
Edward Snowden. The Privacy Shield improved on 
Safe Harbor with new assurances by companies and 
means of redress for European citizens, including an 
ombudsman at the undersecretary level at the De-
partment of State responsible for national security 
cases.4 The ombudsman position, however, remained 
within the executive and lacked the independence 
and authority to invalidate the intelligence commu-
nity’s pursuits in data collection. In the very year the 
Privacy Shield was enacted, the EU’s top data privacy 
officer had already predicted its demise. It was finally 
and unceremoniously struck down with no grace pe-
riod in the Schrems II ruling in July.
More ominously, Schrems II also cast a cloud of 
doubt over standard contractual clauses (SCCs), the 
other primary instrument for regulating data trans-
fers to the United States. Following Schrems I, many 
US tech companies and their European partners 
moved to correctly adopt these clauses, anticipat-
ing that the Privacy Shield was on borrowed time. 
But the ECJ stated that standard contractual clauses 
would only be allowed if the country had legal guar-
antees that meet EU standards. Put bluntly: the de-
fects in the US legal regime that led to the Privacy 
Shield’s fall put SCCs at serious risk as well.
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Now, the sword of Damocles hangs over the future 
openness of the transatlantic corridor for personal 
data – the world’s largest. Already, a phalanx of com-
plaints filed by Max Schrems’s non-governmental 
organization None of Your Business (noyb) are snak-
ing their way through Europe’s dense system of data 
protection authorities. For its part, the European 
Data Protection Board (EDPB), a group of the EU’s 
data protection authorities, offered tough, potential-
ly unworkable guidance on how companies could use 
encryption to protect European data from the prying 
eyes of US intelligence.5 Facebook has threatened to 
pull out of Europe should no new deal for a new data 
flow arrangement be reached.
Moreover, the EU’s questions about government ac-
cess to personal data are not limited to authorized 
data flows to the United States. A US law, the Clari-
fying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act – CLOUD Act, 
for short – requires access by US law enforcement 
to the foreign servers of US companies, for exam-
ple those located on European soil. In 2019, the EDPB 
and European Data Protection Supervisor warned 
that this creates a “conflict of laws” as complying 
with the US CLOUD Act would be a systemic vio-
lation of Europe’s General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR). Consequently, some of Europe’s largest 
cloud service providers – Amazon’s AWS, Microsoft’s 
Azure, and Google Cloud – are caught between the 
legal systems of the EU and the United States. Many 
industry experts believe that, if forced to choose, 
American tech giants would comply with US law. 
Europe’s quest to create Gaia-X, a federated cloud 
framework based on “European rules,” is partly driv-
en by this logic.6
UNDERSTANDING WHAT’S AT STAKE
In the transatlantic context, the pursuit of a durable 
adequacy finding has proven elusive because of the 
aforementioned trilemma – the fundamental incom-
patibility of the three core policy objectives specified 
in this section and illustrated in the graphic on this 
page, each of which is important for Europe.
Open Transatlantic Data Flows: The openness of 
the transatlantic data corridor is key to the $7.1 tril-
5 European Data Protection Board, “41st Plenary session: EDPB adopts recommendations on supplementary measures following Schrems II,” November 11, 
2020: <https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2020/european-data-protection-board-41st-plenary-session-edpb-adopts-recommendations_en> (accessed 
November 30, 2020).
6 It is worth noting that the European Union is considering a proposal for its own cross border electronic evidence access in the form of the E-Evidence 
Directive. The law seems to have many similar attributes to the US CLOUD Act. 
7 Belga, “The man in the hat identified thanks to FBI software,” The Brussels Times, April 15, 2016: <https://www.brusselstimes.com/brussels/37264/the-
man-in-the-hat-identified-thanks-to-fbi-software/> (accessed November 30, 2020).
lion transatlantic economic relationship. While the 
United States maintains a $169 billion trade deficit 
with the EU, it has a $60 billion surplus in services 
– much of it built on the $1.3 trillion of transatlantic 
data flows. Tech is not only a backbone of US pros-
perity and the industrial source of its global pow-
er (including in a security arrangement like NATO), 
but it has also powered European prosperity and 
the European way of life. In the COVID-19 crisis, US 
and UK tech services have been essential lifelines for 
Europe’s economic health, much to the ambivalence 
of some European policymakers. 
Bulk Intelligence Collection: The open data corri-
dor across the Atlantic has also been an advantage 
for European security. From the 2015 Charlie Hebdo 
attacks to the 2016 Brussels bombings, European 
leaders have made assiduous use of US intelligence 
while maintaining political deniability in their own 
complicity in how it has been collected.7 Intelligence 
sharing and cooperation has been cited as essential 
to preventing violent extremist attacks in Europe. 
Access to signals intelligence (SIGINT) – intelligence 
collected through the interception of signals from 
communications and information systems – con-
Source: Author’s own compilation
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tinues to be central to those efforts. For example, 
the United States released information on EU-US 
cooperation on one surveillance program, the Ter-
rorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), that found 
that 40 percent of the total requests for terrorist 
financial data in the past 35 months had come from 
European intelligence agencies; European intelli-
gence received more than three quarters of all re-
ports; and 80,000 terrorist leads resulted from these 
cases.8 In financial data surveillance alone – only one 
slice of the data relationship – the United States co-
operated in European terrorist cases including those 
in Turku (Finland), Barcelona, and Paris, as well as 
those regarding the attacks on the Summer Olympic 
Games in London and by Anders Breivik in Norway. 
Still, the question of proportionality and strictness 
remains contentious, especially within Europe.
Fundamental Rights: The European Charter of Fun-
damental Rights enshrines privacy and the right 
to data protection as expressions of human digni-
ty, an absolute right established in Europe’s post-
War democratic legal tradition. Articles 7 and 8 
of the Charter explicitly state that privacy and da-
ta protection are fundamental rights of European 
citizens. Since the Treaty of Lisbon was enacted in 
December 2019, these rights are given the same 
weight as any element of the EU Treaties. In this tra-
dition – operationalized in the digital space most 
clearly in the GDPR – personal data becomes almost 
like a “digital appendage.” The dignity-based model 
of these rights in the EU differs from that of US pri-
vacy rights, which have tended to be more narrowly 
focused and sometimes commercially-based. In the 
United States, however, attitudes and laws around 
data protection and privacy are currently converg-
ing with Europe.
8 US Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, “Statement by Chairman Adam Klein on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program,” November 19, 2020: 
<https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/EventsAndPress/b8ce341a-71d5-4cdd-a101-219454bfa459/TFTP%20Chairman%20Statement%20
11_19_20.pdf> (accessed November 30, 2020).
9 Graham Smith, “Hard Questions about Soft Limits,” Cyberleagle, October 15, 2020: <https://www.cyberleagle.com/2020/10/hard-questions-about-soft-
limits.html> (accessed November 30, 2020).
10 UK Home Office, “UK and US sign landmark data access agreement,” October 4, 2019: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-sign-
landmark-data-access-agreement> (accessed November 30, 2020).
11 Samuel Stolton, “UK to diverge from EU data protection rules, Johnson confirms,” Euractive, February 6, 2020: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/
digital/news/uk-to-diverge-from-eu-data-protection-rules-johnson-confirms/> (accessed November 30, 2020).
NEW FRICTION POINTS IN 
EUROPE’S DATA PROTECTION
Even as the United States comes to terms with the 
repercussions of Schrems II, a crop of new issues is 
arising that will cause new tensions in Europe’s en-
forcement of personal data protection. In each case, 
the tensions that exist between the EU and US are 
finding expression in the EU’s relations with other 
major digital players.
Post-Brexit EU-UK Data Flows: In October 2020, the 
United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act, a con-
troversial 2016 law that gives broad authority to Brit-
ish leaders to make judgement calls as to the scope 
and size of data collection by Government Commu-
nications Headquarters (GCHQ), indirectly came un-
der the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice.9 
This situation makes the digital aspects of the Brexit 
negotiations – already extremely fraught – that much 
more difficult. Although the UK transposed many as-
pects of GDPR into national law in 2018, warning 
signs are already flashing about the ability of the EU 
and UK to reach a data deal by December 31, 2020. A 
portion of the Investigatory Powers Act is likely to be 
inconsistent with GDPR and, thus, a major roadblock 
in the UK’s quest for adequacy in 2021. Moreover, the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights will no lon-
ger be the law of the land post-Brexit. Adding in-
sult to injury, the UK is also likely to get caught in 
the tangle of its special relationship with the United 
States. Already, EU data hawks have ominously stat-
ed that a landmark 2019 US-UK data access agree-
ment that expedites law enforcement requests would 
require close scrutiny before Europe’s data protec-
tion regulators would give the green light.10 In ad-
dition, Prime Minister Boris Johnson made clear in 
February 2020 that the UK is intent on charting its 
own national course on data protection, complicat-
ing matters even further.11 The economy of the Unit-
ed Kingdom, like that of the United States, benefits 
heavily from its digital services surplus with the EU. 
Cutting it off would be a major economic blow to UK 
prosperity at a time when the economy continues to 
struggle with the shocks of the COVID-19 crisis. 
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China’s Data Access Requirements: China’s case is 
even more worrying. The United States has accu-
rately stated that the EU pays little attention to “da-
ta transfers to authoritarian nations, which merit far 
greater scrutiny than they have received to date.”12 
Once, China’s social media and e-commerce plat-
forms were content to dominate the Chinese mar-
ket. Today, Chinese social media platforms such as 
TikTok, Europe’s second most downloaded app, and 
WeChat are aggressively expanding in Europe, Afri-
ca, and East Asia. Given China’s techno-authoritarian 
legal culture, the relationship between Chinese tech 
12 Bradley A. Brooker et al., “The Need for Clarity After Schrems II,” Lawfare, September 29, 2020: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/need-clarity-after-
schrems-ii> (accessed November 30, 2020).
13 John Sakellariadis, “In TikTok, a bad omen for Chinese technology in Europe,” SupChina, September 1, 2020: <https://supchina.com/2020/09/01/
in-tiktok-a-bad-omen-for-chinese-technology-in-europe/> (accessed November 30, 2020).
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Global Initiative on Data Security, September 8, 2020: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1812951.shtml> (accessed November 30, 2020).
and the government, and the government’s right to 
demand broad access to company data, questions 
about EU transfers to Chinese companies must be 
asked – even if they have adopted GDPR compliance 
as company policy. Data processing authorities in 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and France have already 
launched investigations into TikTok.13 Meanwhile, 
China has launched its Global Initiative on Data Se-
curity, a diplomatic counteroffensive that, at least in 
part, attempts to inoculate it from harder looks into 
its global techno-surveillance practices.14
THE DATA PROTECTION AGENCY LANDSCAPE  
IN EUROPE
NATIONAL DATA  
PROTECTION AUTHORITIES
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COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps: Beyond China and 
the United States, emerging technologies such as AI 
and new circumstances such as the coronavirus pan-
demic will likely create new tensions between Eu-
rope’s partner states and its privacy requirements. 
COVID-19 tracing apps present new questions about 
states that have been deemed essentially equivalent 
to the EU. Israel, a holder of an adequacy finding, 
and South Korea, an aspirant, are engaged in nation-
al contact tracing that is both centralized and con-
tains detailed metadata ultimately ruled out in most, 
though not all, EU member states.15 Court challenges 
to the treatment of contact tracing data by the EU’s 
digital partners are likely – as they are even with-
in the EU.
BREAKING THE TRANSATLANTIC 
DATA TRILEMMA
The European Charter on Fundamental Rights con-
tains competing rights that must be balanced with 
one another. The rights to privacy and protection of 
personal data are clearly there.16 So are the rights to 
security and services of general economic interest, 
as well as the right to “impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority”17 and “re-
gardless of frontiers.”18 Striking the proper balance 
among these will require greater attention to pro-
portionality. The European Court of Justice’s deci-
sions demonstrate that it recognizes this balancing 
act and has left some wiggle room for cases related 
to imminent national security threats.
Schrems II – combined with ECJ’s October rulings 
that put scrutiny on the UK’s Investigatory Powers 
Act – provides greater clarity into what that balanc-
ing act would look like for EU partner countries like 
the United States and United Kingdom. For both, it is 
now a race against the clock. In August, the US and 
EU launched negotiations for an “enhanced” Priva-
cy Shield and the US issued a White Paper clarify-
ing the rules governing data collection in an effort 
15 Christopher Docksey and Christopher Kuner, “The Coronavirus Crisis and EU Adequacy Decisions for Data Transfers,” European Law Blog, April 3, 2020: 
<https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/04/03/the-coronavirus-crisis-and-eu-adequacy-decisions-for-data-transfers/> (accessed November 30, 2020).
16 See Articles 7 and 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/
your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights_en> (accessed November 30, 2020).
17 Bradley A. Brooker et al., “The Need for Clarity After Schrems II” (see note 13).
18 See Articles 6, 36, and 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (see note 17).
19 US Department of Commerce, Joint Press Statement from US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and European Commissioner for Justice Didier 
Reynders, August 10, 2020: <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/08/joint-press-statement-us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-and-
european> (accessed November 30, 2020).
20 Naomi Owen, “New mechanism for EU data transfers ‘may be ready by Christmas,’” GDPR Report, October 1, 2020: <https://gdpr.report/
news/2020/10/01/new-mechanism-for-eu-data-transfers-may-be-ready-by-christmas/> (accessed November 30, 2020).
21 A crux of the issue lies in the Reagan-era Executive Order 12333 on intelligence gathering that contains no redress mechanism for European citizens in 
US intelligence courts. The 2016 Judicial Redress Act, approved almost unanimously in Congress, granted Europeans access to hearings in civil court based 
to bolster the case for keeping standard contractual 
clauses in place.19 The Commission, meanwhile, is 
ambitiously trying to modernize what would be ac-
ceptable in SCCs and wrap up EU-UK adequacy 
negotiations by December 31.20 This is not only po-
litically notable but especially difficult given that the 
EU is simultaneously focused on creating an immi-
nent digital policy Big Bang: tougher rules on com-
petition, the role of platforms as gatekeepers, and 
how to manage disinformation and hate speech – 
the implications of which are not fully known for da-
ta protection. 
In both Europe and the transatlantic space, it is 
now time to be honest that the existing trilemma is 
unsustainable. For the sake of protecting the eco-
nomically critical transatlantic data corridor – and 
Europe’s quest to be a digital player – it is time for 
key actors to address difficult issues head on in order 
to reconcile some core interests. A concerted effort 
across the Atlantic – with the support of like-minded 
democratic states – is needed. 
First, the United States must address the thresh-
olds and accountability for bulk data collection on 
foreign nationals, particularly for allied democ-
racies. The incoming administration of US Pres-
ident-Elect Joe Biden should take the initiative 
to more clearly define the limitations on bulk da-
ta collection through both executive and legislative 
action. As an opening effort early in its new term, the 
Biden administration should extend Privacy Act Pro-
tections to cover European citizens. It is also time to 
take a hard look at Executive Order 12333 and Sec-
tion 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
– the basis for non-discriminant foreign surveillance 
operations like those brought to light in the NSA rev-
elations – to align it with the requirements for con-
tinued, open transatlantic data flows. In addition, the 
time has come to create an effective mechanism for 
individual redress for American, European, and allied 
citizens based in law.21 
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Second, the EU, supported by member states like 
Germany and France, must work more assiduous-
ly to forge a common, durable understanding of 
GDPR enforceability both abroad and at home. For 
the sake of its digital future and capacity to act, the 
European Union must reach a better consensus on 
how its strong data laws apply to the government – 
from the intelligence community and law enforce-
ment to data protection agencies. The EU must also 
be able to negotiate and represent these consensus 
positions in a credible way that can withstand ECJ 
scrutiny. 
Third, the EU should work together in an infor-
mal constellation with United Kingdom and United 
States on compliant data protection and surveil-
lance standards. Given the deep US-UK cooperation 
on intelligence and data sharing, the two countries 
on treatment of their data. Ultimately, it enabled a broad EU-US Umbrella Agreement for data sharing between law enforcement on both sides of the 
Atlantic. For the most part, however, it does not cover cases involving intelligence and national security-related surveillance.
22 Known as Proposition or Prop. 24, the California Privacy Rights Act passed by ballot initiative in the 2020 US elections.
are uniquely positioned to collaborate on surveil-
lance thresholds and redress mechanisms. Going 
further, the US, UK, and EU could move toward con-
verging their cultures of privacy. They could even 
foster cross-border cooperation on new rights re-
lated to AI decision-making, such as those includ-
ed in the 2020 California Privacy Rights Act and a 
future GDPR 2.0.22 In light of the Commission’s re-
lease of a draft Data Governance Act proposal, the 
three should also work together closely on rules for 
non-personal industrial data that continue to favor 
open data flows while maintaining high standards.
Finally, the EU, United States, and United King-
dom – along with like-minded countries such as 
Australia, Japan, and South Korea – should work 
on a twin track approach to personal data gover-
nance in a broader democratic space. They should 
THE ADEQUACY AGREEMENT MAP REMAINS RELATIVELY UNCHARTED
Source: Map based on information found on adequacy decisions at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data- 
protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en>
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set standards for privacy protections and checks 
against abuses to dragoon all foreign data, including 
broadening the scope of cooperation in the OECD 
or Council of Europe. At the same time, they should 
raise greater scrutiny on companies and intelligence 
services based in authoritarian countries like China 
and Russia, imposing real, proportional costs for vio-
lating these protections. In strategic terms, resolving 
the transatlantic trilemma on data will be a key test 
of the ability of the US, UK, and EU to make a via-
ble play for democratic autonomy – creating a broad 
space governed by rules and respect for individual 
rights while asserting economic, political, and tech-
nological weight unmatched by a potential rival or 
collection of rivals. 
Tensions will always be fueled by new technologies, 
applications, and circumstances. Still, establishing an 
equilibrium across a collection of democracies with 
the European Union, United States, and United King-
dom at its core is not merely a desired goal but is fast 
becoming a strategic necessity. Time is running out 
to prevent the spaces in which data can flow freely 
from splintering into even smaller fiefdoms. Europe’s 
competitiveness – and ultimately the technological 
dynamism of the democratic world – depend on it.
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